In Secessionism, Jason Sorens provides definitions of both secession and secessionism. Secession, he says, “is the withdrawal of territory and the people living on that territory from the sovereignty of an existing state and the establishment of a newly independent state with sovereignty over that territory and its people” (Sorens 3). He defines secessionism as including “movements that aim at substantial territorial autonomy for a minority group and do not rule out independence in the future” (Sorens 5). A full definition of a secessionist movement, then, is an organization that supports at least internal sovereignty over some territory it wishes to possess and that does not oppose the eventual possibility of external sovereignty (Sorens 9). Sorens points out that while actual secession itself is rare, secessionist groups and movements are not and can have important effects on the countries in which they arise (Sorens 3). These are all important and thorough definitions that form the framework of some of Soren’s later claims, which address issues of identity, interest, and strategy in secessionist movements.

One key claim made by Sorens is that it is a combination of identity and interest that lead to a popular desire for independence among a certain group (Sorens 6). While culturally distinctive groups are a necessary element for secessionist movements, as Sorens explains in the section on identity, there must be some net benefit that makes secession a better option, in the eyes of the majority of the group, than negotiating and seeking improvement within the current system of government (Sorens 30). These benefits can include cultural, economic, and political factors (Sorens 30). So, secessionism requires cultural difference plus economic and political benefits of sovereignty in order to become a serious political option (Sorens 31). While this may seem an obvious point, it is not always specifically addressed in the field of International Relations, where differences in ethnicity itself is sometimes positioned as the impetus for conflicts with secessionist components. This formula might also explain why some ethnic conflicts involve secessionism while others do not.

Another interesting argument made by Sorens is that “a constitutional right of secession would substantially decrease ethnic violence… without significantly increasing the risks of actual state breakup” and would “result in widespread devolution of power, allowing minorities to obtain rights of self-government in the areas most important to them” (Sorens 8). He adds later that groups feel less secure about their future in countries where secession is prohibited, and where they don’t have as much influence on government policy (Sorens 42). Because of this combination (prohibition of secession with feelings of insecurity and powerlessness), there are fewer actual secessionist movements, but latent support for secession is higher, as the net benefits of independence are higher (Sorens 41-2). In this way, Sorens says, banning secession can actually promote secessionism (Sorens 46). It is for these reasons that he argues that governments should not prohibit secession, but rather protect it as a right. This argument, while complicated and seemingly counterintuitive, did make sense to me in some ways. If nothing else, minority groups in states that recognize secession as a right might be able to use secession as a kind of bargaining chip in negotiations for limited regional autonomy or to force the central government to recognize and address other specific concerns of theirs.